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Abstract
An increasing concern in power systems is on how to elicit flexibilities in demands for better supply/demand balance. To
this end, several differentiated energy services have been put forward, wherein demands are discriminated by their different
flexibility levels. Motivated by the duration-differentiated energy services, we have proposed energy services differentiated by
durations, arrival times, and deadlines. The purpose of this paper is to study the market implementation of such multiple-
arrival multiple-deadline differentiated energy services. To verify the economic feasibility, we establish that in a forward market,
there exists an efficient competitive equilibrium which attains the maximum social welfare. In addition, we show that future
information will influence current decisions on power delivery by studying a special kind of causal allocation policy. Finally,
we propose two tractable integer programs, namely the optimal arbitrage and the minimum-cost allocation problems, which
can be embedded in a two-level hierarchical real-time implementation of differentiated energy services.
Keywords: Smart grid; Demand response; Market implementation; Competitive equilibrium; Tractable integer programming.
1 Introduction
We usually rely on operating reserves to balance supplies
and demands in power systems. Such a supply-side ap-
proach is effective when the majority of power resources
remain traditional resources, e.g., fossil fuels. Nowadays,
more and more renewable energy, mainly generated
from wind and solar farms, are being integrated into
current power systems. With clean and inexhaustible
sources, the strength of renewable resources is evident.
Nevertheless, their inherent features, such as uncer-
tainty and intermittency, have brought difficulties in
the supply/demand balance. As a consequence, a large
number of reserves have to be built to compensate for the
volatility of the supply, at the expense of economic and
environmental benefits [1]. For that reason, the supply-
side approach is losing its effectiveness [2].
On the other hand, increasing attention has been paid to
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leveraging flexibilities in demands to match supplies, of-
ten referred to as the demand response [3]. For example,
without compromising on their levels of functionality,
the charging processes of electric vehicles and residential
pool pumps [4,5], can be modulated, suspended, and/or
resumed appropriately to aid in the supply/demand
balance. Substantial relevant results have been recorded
in the literature [6–11]. Particularly, the GRIP (grids
with intelligent periphery) is proposed in [12], which
conceptually presents a platform so as to implement a
variety of applications regarding demand response.
Apart from the technical matters, we are concerned
about economic issues, e.g., what are electricity products
capable of eliciting load flexibilities? The traditional
approach mostly treats electricity energy as homoge-
neous products sold at a unit price, while in demand
response, we can classify electricity services into distinct
energy products according to their different levels of
flexibility. Based on this, several electricity markets have
been theoretically established and analyzed to verify the
practicability of demand response from the viewpoints
of economics. See, for instance, [13–16] and [17].
Among kinds of demand-response services, of particular
interest to us are differentiated energy services, which
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were firstly proposed and analyzed in [15] and [18]. The
services studied in the two papers are called duration-
differentiated energy services, since they are classified
by durations, which correspond to the quantities of
available energy with a fixed power delivery rate.
In the aforementioned pioneering work, the energy can
be delivered over the operational period. If we assign a
deadline to each service and require the power delivery
to be completed before the deadline, then such services
are called duration-deadline jointly differentiated energy
services. As the name indicates, the electricity services
herein are distinguished by both the duration and
deadline. Related analyses can be found in [14] and [19].
Along this research line, in our previous papers [10,20],
we propose a more practical setup by allowing involved
services to have different arrival times. In this case, the
available energy of each service can only be delivered
from its arrival time to its deadline. Then, the flexibility
levels of services are determined by the duration, arrival
time, and deadline. We refer to such services as Multiple-
Arrival Multiple-Deadline (MAMD) differentiated en-
ergy services. The resulting supply/demand matching
problem has been studied in the mentioned papers. In
this paper, we continue to inquire into the market im-
plementation of MAMD differentiated energy services.
Firstly, we analyze a forward market implementation
of MAMD differentiated energy services by considering
two critical economic issues. One is the social welfare
maximization problem, where all the market partici-
pants are altruistic and cooperative, while the other is
the competitive equilibrium, where each member par-
ticipates rationally in its own interests. We demonstrate
that the optimum of social welfare can be attained in
a competitive way. In other words, the mechanism of
this market is in itself capable of leading self-interested
consumers to the optimum social welfare even without
the aid of a social planner. This verifies the economic
feasibility of MAMD differentiated energy services.
Then, we check whether future information will influence
the optimality of current decision-making on power allo-
cation, for the sake of real-time applications of MAMD
differentiated energy services. This is done by exploring
the existence of a special type of causal allocation policy,
which constructs a desirable power delivery without
knowing the amounts of energy available in the future.
Finally, we put forward a two-level hierarchical scenario
for the real-time implementation of MAMD differen-
tiated energy services. Each level is associated with
a special integer optimization problem. They are the
optimal arbitrage problem concentrating on ameliorat-
ing the supply in a proper way, and the minimum-cost
allocation problem aiming at minimizing distribution
costs. Both problems are motivated by real applications
but tractable from a computational perspective.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Preliminary knowl-
edge is presented in Section 2. We give a detailed account
for MAMD differentiated energy services in Section 3,
where the supply/demand matching problem is revis-
ited. We deal with the forward market implementation in
Section 4, where the social welfare optimization problem
is examined in Section 4.1, while the competitive equi-
librium is studied in Section 4.2. In Section 5, we discuss
the special allocation policies in the absence of future
information. The real-time implementation scenario is
introduced in Section 6. Finally, we end this paper with
conclusions and future work. Preliminary results on the
special case of duration-deadline jointly differentiated
energy services were presented in [14].
Notation
The set of real numbers (resp. nonnegative integers) is
denoted by R (resp. N). Other sets are represented by
calligraphic capital letters. We use italic capital letters
to denote tensors including matrices except that T
and N are reserved as special integers as indicated later.
Particularly, matrices with all the elements being zeros
or ones are respectively specified by O or E, whose sizes
are inferred from the context. For a matrix A, its trace is
denoted by tr(A). Moreover, we use A(n, :)′ and A(:, t)
to denote the nth row and tth column of A, respectively.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, we define ‖x‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi|. For
an assertion A, the indicator function 1(A) is one (resp.
zero) if A is true (resp. false). Define [a]+ = max{a, 0}
for a real number a.
2 Preliminary
Several basic concepts on the majorization order will be
introduced, and more details can be found in [21]. For
a real vector x = [x1 x2 · · · xN ]′, its nonincreasing
rearrangement is denoted by x[1] ≥ x[2] ≥ · · · ≥ x[N ].
Definition 1 For x,y ∈ RN , define x ≺w y, saying x
is weakly supermajorized by y, if∑N
i=s
x[i] ≥
∑N
i=s
y[i], for all s = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
and x ≺w y, saying x is weakly submajorized by y, if∑s
i=1
x[i] ≤
∑s
i=1
y[i], for all s = 1, 2, . . . , N.
If further,
∑N
i=1 xi=
∑N
i=1 yi, then write x ≺ y and say
that x is majorized by y.
If we only consider N -dimensional real vectors in their
nonincreasing rearrangements, the majorization order
can be regarded as a partial order. If x ∈ Nn, we define
the partition conjugate of x, denoted by x∗, as a vector
in such a way that the jth element of x∗ is the number of
elements in x which are no less than j. Mathematically,
2
we write x∗j =
∑N
i=1 1(xi ≥ j), for all j ∈ N/{0}.
Clearly, x∗ is nonincreasing and x∗j = 0 if j > maxi{xi}.
The length of x∗ can be inferred from the context and
should be no less than maxi{xi}.
3 MAMD Differentiated Energy Services
Table 1
A summary of symbols.
Symbol Description
T Total number of time slots; T ∈ N.
t Time slot index; t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
λ+1 number of special time instances; λ ∈ N.
Ti Arrival times or deadlines; i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
N Total number of loads involved; N ∈ N.
n Load index; n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
ht Available energy in time slot t; ht ∈ N.
h Supply profile; h = [h1 h2 · · · hT ]′.
rn Duration requirement of load n; rn ∈ N.
r Demand profile; r = [r1 r2 · · · rN ]′.
Tan Arrival time of load n; an ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
Tdn Deadline of load n; dn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
(rn, Tan , Tdn) The service required by load n.
F Pattern matrix; F ∈ {0, 1}N×T .
A Power allocation matrix; A ∈ {0, 1}N×T .
A(h, r, F ) Feasible power allocation matrices.
W (h, r, F ) Structure tensor.
In this section, we firstly revisit the setup of MAMD
differentiated energy services introduced in [10]. Then,
we review the supply/demand matching problem –
under what conditions can the supply fulfill the demand
requirements? For clarity, we summarize the symbols
introduced in this section in Table 1.
3.1 Supply/Demand Model Formulation
We evenly divide the operational horizon into T sequen-
tial time slots, indexed by t. At each time slot, the power
generated from renewable resources can be delivered to
a load at a certain rate, which is an integer multiple of
the base rate. The power delivery during a single time
slot can not be suspended. As indicated in [20], it is
enough to consider a simpler case where all the loads
can only be charged at the base rate, which is assumed
to be one unit per time slot and other related quantities
are scaled accordingly. Overall, both the time and the
electrical energy are quantized.
Let ht ∈ N denote the available units of electrical
energy at time slot t. Hence, the supply can be concisely
delineated by the supply profile:
h = [h1 h2 · · · hT ]′.
The service provider points out a sequence of special
time instances:
T0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < Tλ−1 < Tλ,
wherein T0 = 0 and Tλ = T .
Considering a collection of deterministic loads, indexed
by n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we assume that each load claims
a piece of MAMD differentiated energy service. The
duration requirement of load n is denoted by rn, which
specifies how many units of energy are required by this
load. The service time of load n is denoted by (Tan , Tdn),
where Tan is the arrival time while Tdn is the deadline
of this load. To be precise, the power delivery from
the supply to load n can be allowed to occur only
in time slots indexed by Tan + 1, Tan + 2, . . . , Tdn . As
a whole, the MAMD differentiated energy service of
load n, denoted by (rn, Tan , Tdn), is characterized by the
duration requirement rn and the service time (Tan , Tdn).
A charging profile is given by a (0, 1)-vector of length T
whose positions of ones signify the time slots sched-
uled for the power delivery via a certain service. The
charging profile is said to be feasible for load n or the
service (rn, Tan , Tdn), if the sum of its elements is equal
to the duration requirement rn and all of its elements
indexed by integers outside the closed interval [Ta+1, Td]
are zeros. As long as the requirements of duration and
service time are satisfied, load n is indifferent to the
actual power delivery time. That reflects the flexibility
of involved loads.
Example 2 Assume λ = 3, T1 = 1, T2 = 4, and T = 6.
Then, consider a load requires the differentiated en-
ergy service specified by (2, 1, 4). Clearly, the charging
profiles, [0 1 0 0 0 0]′ and [1 1 0 0 0 0]′, are not
feasible for the service, since the former violates the
duration requirement and the latter contradicts the given
service time. In fact, there are three possible feasible
charging profiles, namely, [0 1 1 0 0 0]′, [0 1 0 1 0 0]′,
and [0 0 1 1 0 0]′. The load is indifferent of the three
feasible profiles.
To be concise, all the duration requirements constitute
the demand profile:
r = [r1 r2 · · · rN ]′.
The pattern matrix F associated with theN loads refers
to an N × T (0, 1)-matrix whose ones at the nth row
appear at the positions indexed by Ta+1, Ta+2, . . . , Td
exactly, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . In short, we use (r, F ) to
represent all the requirements of the collection of loads.
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3.2 Supply/Demand Matching Revisited
Given a supply profile h and a collection of loads
with requirements specified by (r, F ), we say that the
supply h is adequate for the demand (r, F ), if there
exists a feasible power allocation such that the available
supply h can satisfy the load requirements (r, F ). Math-
ematically, a feasible allocation is described by an N×T
matrix A, called the feasible power allocation matrix,
which satisfies
A(n, t)∈{0, 1}, t = 1, 2, . . . , T & n = 1, 2, . . . , N ; (1)
‖A(n, :)′ ‖1 = rn, n = 1, 2, . . . , N ; (2)
‖A(:, t)‖1 ≤ ht, t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; (3)
O ≤ A ≤ F. (4)
Denote the class of all the feasible power allocation ma-
trices by A(h, r, F ). From a mathematical perspective,
the supply/demand matching problem is to examine the
nonemptiness of the matrix classA(h, r, F ) and find one
of its elements if A(h, r, F ) is nonempty.
Throughout this paper, the monotonicity assumption
below holds for notational convenience:
hTi+1 ≥ hTi+2 ≥ · · · ≥ hTi+1 , for all i = 0, 1, . . . , λ− 1.
If λ = 1, then F = E and the nonemptiness ofA(h, r, E)
was characterized by D. Gale and H. J. Ryser [22,23].
Theorem 3 (Gale-Ryser) The matrix classA(h, r, E)
is nonempty if and only if h ≺w r∗ or r ≺w h∗.
According to our assumption, we can rewrite the ma-
jorization inequalities in the Gale-Ryser theorem as
T∑
t>k
ht −
N∑
n=1
[rn − k]+ ≥ 0, k = 0, 1, . . . , T. (5)
The results in [10] and [20] generalize the left part above
for λ ≥ 1 by defining a λth-order structure tensor as
Wk1k2···kλ(h, r, F )=
T1∑
t>k1
ht +
T2∑
t>T1+k2
ht + · · ·+
Tλ∑
t>Tλ−1+kλ
ht
−
N∑
n=1
[rn − (kan+1 + kan+2 + · · ·+ kdn)]+,
where ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti − Ti−1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , λ. We
write W (h, r, F ) ≥ 0 if every element in W (h, r, F )
is nonnegative. The following theorem, firstly recorded
in [10], specifies the condition under which the supply
can satisfy the demand in the form of the nonnegativity
of the tensor defined previously. An extension of the
theorem will be addressed and applied in later sections.

1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
 k2
k1 0 1 2
0 0 0 1
1 0 -1 0
k2
k1 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
Figure 1. A pattern matrix and two structure tensors.
Theorem 4 A supply profile h is adequate for the
demand (r, F ) if and only if W (h, r, F ) ≥ 0.
Example 5 Let λ = 2, T0 = 0, T1 = 2, T2 = 3.
There are three loads in total. The associated pattern
matrix F is shown on the left of Figure 1. Hence, for any
supply/demand profiles, the associated structure tensor
has the size 2× 3, where k1 = 0, 1 and k2 = 0, 1, 2. Let
hˆ = r = [3 1 2]′ and h˜ = [3 2 1]′.
The values of the two tensors W (hˆ, r, F ) and W (h˜, r, F )
are recorded on the right of Figure 1 in the order they are
mentioned, wherein W11(hˆ, r, F ) is calculated by
hˆ2 − [r1 − k1 − k2]+ − [r2 − k1 − k2]+ − [r3 − k1]+
= 1− [3− 1− 1]+ − [1− 1− 1]+ − [2− 1]+ = −1.
Thus, we have W (hˆ, r, F )  0 and W (h˜, r, F ) ≥ 0. By
Theorem 4, we conclude that the matrix class A(hˆ, r, F )
is empty whileA(h˜, r, F ) is nonempty. This is consistent
with what we observed.
Theorem 4 gives rise to an intriguing physical interpre-
tation of the supply/demand matching. It means that
the adequacy of the supply h for the demand (r, F )
can be derived from the fact that the demand tails are
dominated by the corresponding supply tails for all the
critical points. Let us explain more with the simplest
case where λ = 1. In this case, the nonnegativity of
the tensor is equivalent to the formula (5). Moreover,
for k = 0, 1, . . . , T , the minuend of (5) is the summation
of the least T −k elements of the supply profile and thus
is named as the (k + 1)th supply tail. In contrast, the
subtrahend is called the (k + 1)th demand tail because
it is the aggregation of remaining duration requirements
of all loads, assuming that the number of units of each
load n receiving from the first k time slots is at least
the minimum of k and rn. The (k + 1)th inequality
means that the (k+ 1)th demand tail should not exceed
the (k+ 1)th supply tail. For cases where λ > 1, similar
interpretations can be obtained. Rather than a scalar k,
every supply/demand tail pair is indexed by a vector
of length λ, i.e., [k1 k2 · · · kλ]′. In the same way, the
nonnegativity of the element indexed by [k1 k2 · · · kλ]′
in the tensor W (h, r, F ) corresponds to the dominance
relationship between the associated supply/demand tail
pair [20].
4
4 A Forward Market Implementation
Apart from the supply/demand matching, another basic
issue regarding MAMD differentiated energy services
arises – from the perspective of economics, are such
electricity services practicable? Referring to the proce-
dures in [14] and [15], we hereinafter explore the MAMD
differentiated energy services in a forward market, where
all the contracts have been signed before future delivery.
In particular, we consider a continuum of consumers and
no single load is strong enough to have a marked effect on
the market. Under these assumptions, every participant
will act as a price taker and the problem setup is a little
different from that built in Section 3. We begin with a
detailed description of this forward market. The main
three elements involved are given as follows:
1) Supply: Assume the supplies are all from free
renewable resources. In advance of transactions,
the energy provider knows the supply pro-
file h = [h1 h2 · · · hT ]′.
2) Services: An electricity service (r, Ta, Td) is char-
acterized by the duration requirement r and the
service time specified by the arrival time Ta and
the deadline Td. For the same reason as mentioned
before, assume that every service just provides the
base power delivery rate, i.e., one unit per time slot.
3) Consumers: A continuum of loads are indexed
by the unit interval, namely, x ∈ [0, 1]. Each
consumer x is characterized by a quadru-
ple
(
r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
, where l(x) ∈ R+ is
interpreted as a per capita demand. The utility
for consumer x employing l(x) pieces of the
service
(
r(x), Ta(x), Td(x)
)
is given by
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
.
The utility function U is bounded and nonnegative-
valued, where U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), 0
)
= 0. We
denote the continuum of loads by
Rc = {(r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)), x ∈ [0, 1]} .
With a slight modification, we can obtain the following
structure tensor W c(h,Rc) for the continuum of loads:
W ck1k2···kλ(h,Rc) =
T1∑
t>k1
ht+
T2∑
t>T1+k2
ht+· · ·+
Tλ∑
t>Tλ−1+kλ
ht−∫ 1
0
l(x)[r(x)− ka(x)+1 − · · · − kd(x)]+dx,
where ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti − Ti−1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , λ.
Following directly from Theorem 4 concerned with a
finite number of discrete loads, the proposition below
addresses the adequacy of an supply by virtue of an
associated structure tensor in the continuum case, as
defined above.
Proposition 6 The supply profile h is adequate for a
continuum of consumersRc if and only ifW c(h,Rc)≥0.
In the sequel of this section, two economic issues will
be discussed. One involves centralized optimization,
focusing on the social welfare maximization, while the
other concerns distributive optimization, coping with
the competitive equilibrium.
4.1 Social Welfare Maximization
Assuming there is a social planner, we wonder what the
overall benefit is in this market. The social welfare is
measured by the summation of consumer welfare and
supplier revenue. The consumer welfare is defined as the
difference between consumers’ total utilities and their
expenditure for purchasing MAMD differentiated energy
services, while the supplier revenue is defined as the dif-
ference between the gross profit from selling the MAMD
differentiated energy services and the capitalized gener-
ation cost. Since all the supplies come from renewable
resources, the generation cost is negligible. Hence, the
social welfare function is reduced to the overall utilities of
the continuum of consumers. Mathematically, the social
welfare maximization problem is formulated as
max
r(x),Ta(x),Td(x),l(x)
∫ 1
0
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
dx
subject to l(x) ≥ 0; 0 ≤ Ta(x) ≤ Td(x) ≤ Tλ;
0 ≤ r(x) ≤ Td(x) − Ta(x);
W c(h,Rc) ≥ 0. (6)
The constraints, except for W c(h,Rc) ≥ 0, are called
rationality constraints, because they are automatically
satisfied for rational economic behaviors.
Proposition 7 The social welfare maximization prob-
lem (6) has an optimal solution for any type of measurable
utility function U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
.
PROOF. Define a set Z(x) = [Zk1k2···kλ(x)] with
Z(0) = 0 and Z˙(x) = [ωk1k2···kλ(x)], where
ωk1k2···kλ(x)=

l(x)[r(x)− ka(x)+1 − · · ·−kd(x)]+,
when 0≤k1≤T1, 0≤k2≤T2 − T1,
. . . , 0 ≤ kλ ≤ Tλ − Tλ−1;
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
,
when k1 = −1, 0 ≤ k2 ≤ T2 − T1,
. . . , 0 ≤ kλ ≤ Tλ − Tλ−1.
(7)
For all loads indexed by x ∈ [0, 1], we define the set of
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differential terms subject to the rational constraints by
Ω(x) =
{
ω(x) | l(x) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Ta(x) ≤ Td(x) ≤ λ,
0 ≤ r(x) ≤ Td(x) − Ta(x)
}
. (8)
Thus, we obtain a set-valued correspondence: x 7→ Ω(x).
For simplicity, we write it in a compact form:
Z˙(x) ∈ Ω(x).
According to the integration of set-valued functions
defined in [24], we denote the integral of the set-valued
correspondence as follows:
G =
∫ 1
0
Ω(x)dx.
Combining (7) with (8), we rewrite the expression as:
G = {Z(1) | Z(1) reached by a service allocation
x 7→ (r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x))} .
By the first four theorems with respect to the integration
of a set-valued function described in [24], we conclude
that G is convex and closed.
Then, we can redescribe the social welfare optimization
problem by the notation regarding Z(x) and G and see
whether the feasible region is compact:
max
Z(1)
Z−1 0 ··· 0(1)
subject to Z(1) ∈ G; (9a)
Zk1k2···kλ(1) ≤
T1∑
j>k1
hj +
T2∑
j>T1+k2
hj + · · ·+
Tλ∑
j>Tλ−1+kλ
hj ,
for ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti − Ti−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , λ. (9b)
Constraint (9b) consists of linear inequalities only. In
light of this and the analysis of G, the optimization
variable Z(1) is restricted to a compact and convex
set by constraints (9a) and (9b). It follows that the
optimal solution Z∗(1) to the social welfare problem
exists, regardless of the type of utility function.
In conclusion, the social maximization problem reveals
the ceiling overall benefit that can be attained by all the
market participants. It allocates the resources optimally
in a central manner. However, in a real market, not every
market participant will be completely disinterested.
4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
The following analysis is established in a perfectly
competitive market, wherein every participant (i.e., the
M = {r, Ta, Td, piTa,Tdr }
{
nTa,Tdr
∣∣ }Ta, Td ∈ {T0, T1, . . . , Tλ} , Ta ≤ Td, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Td − Ta}
(
r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
, x ∈ [0, 1]
Figure 2. Market information flow.
supplier and consumers) behaves as a rational and selfish
price-taker. Although the dynamics of such a market are
outside the scope of this paper, we sketch the information
flow in Figure 2. The price of a piece of the service
specified by (r, Ta, Td) is pi
Ta,Td
r and pi
Ta,Td
0 = 0. Facing
a menu of services associated with prices
M = {r, Ta, Td, piTa,Tdr } ,
each consumer x chooses a service
{
r(x), Ta(x), Td(x)
}
and a quantity level, denoted by l(x). Correspondingly,
the supplier calculates the number nTa,Tdr of each ser-
vice (r, Ta, Td). After the long-run evolution of this
competitive market, the price of each service converges
to an equilibrium price, which should bring no incentives
for rational participants to adjust their strategies. The
discussions on equilibrium theory can be traced back to
the pioneering work of Le´on Walras [25]. We herein start
with a detailed description of a competitive equilibrium.
For a market with the MAMD differentiated energy ser-
vices described in this work, a competitive equilibrium is
defined as a state satisfying the three conditions below:
1) Consumers maximize their own welfare. Consumer x
selects l(x) pieces of the service
(
r(x), Ta(x), Td(x)
)
in
order to maximize its net benefit. This amounts to
solving the optimization problem below:
max
r(x),Ta(x),Td(x),l(x)
(
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
− l(x)piTa(x),Td(x)r(x)
)
.
2) The supplier maximizes its revenue. Note that the
production capacity is limited. To ensure the sup-
ply/demand balance, the adequacy constraint has to
be considered. Firstly, define two symbols:
δTa,Tdj =
∑
j≤r≤Td−Ta
nTa,Tdr , and
F = {(Ta, Td) | Ta ≤ Td & Ta, Td ∈ {T0, T1, . . . , Tλ}} .
Then, we obtain the following supplier revenue max-
imization problem. The constraints below follow
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naturally from the nonnegativity of the associated
structure tensor and the definition of δTa,Tdj .
max
n
Ta,Td
r
∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
Td−Ta∑
r=1
nTa,Tdr pi
Ta,Td
r
subject to
T1∑
j>k1
hj +
T2∑
j>T1+k2
hj + · · ·+
Tλ∑
j>Tλ−1+kλ
hj
−
∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
∑
j>
∑d
m=a+1
km
δTa,Tdj ≥ 0,
for ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti − Ti−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , λ.
3) The market is clear, i.e., the supply and demand
balance out. For (Ta, Td) ∈ F and 0 ≤ r ≤ Td − Ta,
we have
nTa,Tdr =
∫ 1
0
l(x)1(r(x) = r, Ta(x)= Ta, Td(x)= Td)dx.
Note that the analysis with respect to the competitive
equilibrium relies heavily on the assumption that an
individual transaction has no influence on prices. As
suggested in the seminal paper [26], in a competitive
economic model, the first thought coming to mind is to
investigate whether an equilibrium exists or not when
decisions are made in such a distributed manner as
described above. If it indeed exists, a natural question
then arises – what is the gap between the social welfare
in a competitive equilibrium and the maximum social
welfare attained by a social planner? By convention,
a competitive equilibrium serves as the benchmark of
efficiency in economic analysis. If the aforementioned
gap is zero, then the competitive equilibrium is said to
be efficient. Otherwise, it is inefficient. The following
theorem signifies the existence of an efficient competitive
equilibrium.
Theorem 8 There exists an efficient competitive equi-
librium in a forward market with MAMD differentiated
energy services.
PROOF. In view of Proposition 7, we prove this
theorem by finding a menu of service prices, which
can make a competitive equilibrium attainable, by the
method of Lagrangian duality.
Let Z∗(1) and x 7→ (r∗(x), Ta∗(x), Td∗(x), l∗(x)) denote
the optimal solution to the social welfare maximization
problem (9) and the corresponding optimal social allo-
cation, respectively. Dualize the social welfare problem
regarding the constraints described by (9b). As a result,
there exist a bundle of Lagrange multipliers
αk1k2···kλ≥ 0, for ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti−Ti−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , λ,
such that Z∗(1) is also the optimal solution to the
following optimization problem:
max
Z(1)∈G
Z−1 0 ··· 0(1)−
∑
k1,k2,...,kλ
αk1k2···kλZk1k2···kλ(1). (10)
In the meantime, the complementary slackness should
also be satisfied, which implies that
αk1k2···kλ
[
Z∗k1k2···kλ(1)−(∑T1
j>k1
hj + · · ·+
∑Tλ
j>Tλ−1+kλ
hj
)]
= 0, (11)
for ki = 0, 1, . . . , Ti − Ti−1, i = 1, 2, . . . , λ.
Then, we rewrite the term being maximized in (10) in
accordance with (7) to obtain
∫ 1
0
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)− l(x)piTa(x),Td(x)r(x) dx,
(12)
wherein,
pi
Ta(x),Td(x)
r(x) =
∑
k1,k2,...,kλ
αk1k2···kλ
r(x)− d(x)∑
m=a(x)+1
km
+. (13)
In the following, we explain why we use the notation
for service prices above. To start with, we consider
the consumer benefit maximization. We go back to the
term (12) and treat it as the summation of an infinite
number of sub-terms indexed by x ∈ [0, 1], and all these
sub-terms are independent of each other. From this point
of view, since Z∗(1) solves (10), it is not difficult to see
that
(
r∗(x), Ta∗(x), Td∗(x), l∗(x)
)
=
arg max
r(x),Ta(x),Td(x),l(x)
{
U
(
x, r(x), Ta(x), Td(x), l(x)
)
− l(x)piTa(x),Td(x)r(x)
}
.
Hence, we conclude that no consumer will intend to vi-
olate the optimal allocation
(
r∗(x), Ta∗(x), Td∗(x), l∗(x)
)
under the prices given by (13).
To verify the equilibrium prices, it remains to show
that under such prices, not only does the production
described by nTa,Tdr maximize the supplier revenue, but
also it can balance out the requirements of consumers in
the market. Firstly, the supplier revenue can be restated
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as
∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
Td−Ta∑
r=1
nTa,Tdr pi
Ta,Td
r =
∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
Td−Ta∑
j=1
δTa,Tdj (pi
Ta,Td
j − piTa,Tdj−1 ),
where δTa,Tdj =
∑
j≤r≤Td−Ta n
Ta,Td
r . Substituting the
expression of the price (13) into the above formula yields
∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
Td−Ta∑
r=1
nTa,Tdr pi
Ta,Td
r
=
∑
k1+k2+···+kλ≤T
αk1k2···kλ
 ∑
(Ta,Td)∈F
∑
j>
∑d
m=a+1
km
δTa,Tdj

≤
∑
k1+k2+···+kλ≤T
αk1k2···kλ
 T1∑
j>k1
hj + · · ·+
Tλ∑
j>Tλ−1+kλ
hj

=
∑
k1+k2+···+kλ≤T
αk1k2···kλZ
∗
k1k2···kλ(1).
The inequality above follows directly from the adequacy
constraint which is described by the nonnegativity of
an associated structure tensor, while the last equality
follows from the formula (11), as implied by the comple-
mentary slackness. Thus, it is clear that the maximum
supplier revenue can be achieved when the production
bundle is given by
nTa,Tdr =
∫ 1
0
l(x)1(r∗(x) = r, Ta∗(x)= Ta, Td∗(x)= Td)dx,
for 0 ≤ r ≤ Td−Ta. In the meantime, we observe that the
production bundle can make the market clear. Hence,
we have shown that the optimal solution to the social
welfare maximization problem (9) can help generate
a menu of equilibrium prices, which can result in a
state satisfying the three conditions for a competitive
equilibrium. This completes the proof.
In the proof of Theorem 8, the Lagrange multiplier
method is applied, which is well known to have a
heuristic economic interpretation [27]. In view of the
price expression (13), the Lagrange multipliers work
as implicit price factors. To further explain this, each
multiplier indexed by [k1 k2 · · · kr]′ adds a nonnegative
weight to a corresponding term of demand tail, denoted
by [r − ∑dm=a+1 km]+. To sum up, the price of the
service (r, Ta, Td) is given by the summation of the
weighted terms over [k1 k2 · · · kr]′. Furthermore, from
the expression of the equilibrium price (13), we can get
considerable practical insights which are consistent with
our intuitions:
(1) With the service time specified by (Ta, Td) fixed,
the price function piTa,Tdr is nondecreasing as the
duration requirement r increases.
(2) Taking two service times,
(
Taˆ, Tdˆ
)
and
(
Ta˜, Td˜
)
,
into consideration, if Taˆ ≥ Ta˜ and Tdˆ ≤ Td˜, then
we conclude by (13) that
pi
Taˆ,Tdˆ
r ≥ piTa˜,Td˜r , for 0 ≤ r ≤ Tdˆ − Taˆ.
The intuition behind lies in that the less laxity the service
has, the higher the price of the service will be.
Theorem 8 signifies that the optimum social welfare can
be sustained in a competitive equilibrium, irrespective
of the presence of a social planner. This allows us to
skirt the debate on the planner economy and the market
economy to a certain degree. As shown in [14], [15] and
this paper, it is an accepted practice to check whether a
new market is well-defined theoretically by exploring an
efficient competitive equilibrium. In an efficient market,
each participant makes decisions for its own benefit,
but the market dynamics can converge to a socially
optimal status automatically. Although these results rest
on a perfectly competitive price system in a forward
market, they indeed reveal the potential for the success
of MAMD differentiated energy services in a practical
market implementation.
5 Allocation without Future Information
In the previous section, we assume the energy provider
knows the supply profile. However, in practice, it is hard
for us to predict renewable electricity generations. With
a view to real-time applications of MAMD differentiated
energy services, we are wondering whether we can
design an efficient power allocation policy such that it
can always generate an appropriate power allocation
without unnecessary waste or unexpected shortages in
the absence of future information.
Definition 9 An allocation policy is said to be optimal
in terms of feasibility if it exports a feasible allocation
whenever we are given a supply/demand pair such that
the supply is adequate for the demand.
An allocation policy is said to be causal if it is a power
delivery strategy without knowing future information.
Recall that we use an N×T (0, 1)-matrix A to represent
a power allocation. We call A(:, t) the allocation vector
of time slot t; moreover, the allocation vectors of the
first t time slots are summarized as A(:, 1 : t). At the
beginning of each time slot t, the causal scheduler gets
to know the available energy ht and publish A(:, t), as
depicted by the flow graph in Figure 3.
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START
Causal Allocation Policy
A(:, t)
t = t+ 1
A (:, 1 : (t− 1))
[h1 h2 . . . ht]
t = 1
Figure 3. Illustration of a causal allocation policy.
Generally speaking, if there exists a causal allocation
policy which is optimal in terms of feasibility, then it will
bring convenience for the system operator to construct a
feasible allocation for an adequate supply/demand pair
in real time, since it suffices to estimate the available
energy of the next time slot accurately.
We observe that such an optimal causal allocation policy
indeed exists when the pattern matrix presents several
special patterns. For example, restricted to duration-
differentiated energy services, we can apply a greedy
allocation policy to attain a feasible allocation matrix
causally whenever the supply is adequate. This policy as-
signs the energy units available in the current time slot to
loads with longer remaining duration requirements and
is therefore named as the Longest Duration First (LDF)
algorithm [15]. In a similar manner, if all the loads
share the same deadline but may have different arrival
times, the LDF algorithm still works by comparing the
remaining duration requirements of arrived loads. For
more such special patterns, one can refer to [28].
In the following, for the sake of contrast, let us see why
the LDF algorithm can help us find feasible allocation
vectors A(:, t) in chronological order in the duration-
differentiated energy services from a different viewpoint
to that in [15]. For this purpose, it is enough to illustrate
the mechanism on constructing A(:, 1) under the LDF
algorithm. We use h(2 : t) to denote the supply available
from time slot 2 to time slot T . Firstly, feasible allocation
vectors for the first time slot constitute the following set:
{a | a ∈ {0, 1}N ,a ≤ r, and ‖a‖1 ≤ h1}.
Then, we expect to find an element a in the above set
such that the remaining demand r − a can be satisfied
by as many kinds of future supply profile h(2 : T ) as
possible. Finally, recall that the adequacy condition in
this case reduces to a majorization inequality h ≺w r∗.
The lemma below follows directly from Section 2.
Lemma 10 If rˆ ≺w r˜, then
{x ∈ NT−1 | x ≺w r˜∗} ⊆ {x ∈ NT−1 | x ≺w rˆ∗}.
It follows from Lemma 10 that the smaller the remaining
demand r − a is in the weak submajorization order, it
can be satisfied by more kinds of future supply. We can
show by simple calculation that, given A(:, 1) generated
by the LDF algorithm, r−A(:, 1) is weakly submajorized
by r − a, where a is a feasible allocation vector for the
first time slot. Hence, we can conclude that, if h(2 : T )
is adequate for the remaining demand r − a, then it is
also adequate for r −A(:, 1), since{
x ∈ NT−1 | x ≺w (r − a)∗} ⊆{
x ∈ NT−1 | x ≺w (r −A(:, 1))∗} .
At this point, we have shown that there exists a causal
allocation which is optimal in terms of feasibility by
considering duration-differentiated energy services ex-
clusively. However, things get much more complicated
when we allow different arrival times and deadlines.
Proposition 11 There exists no causal allocation policy
that is optimal in terms of feasibility for MAMD differ-
entiated energy services.
PROOF. We prove it by examples. We use star symbols
to denote fixed zeros, indicating the unavailable service
time slots for each load. Two loads are involved. Their
duration requirement are respectively given by r1 = 4
and r2 = 2, and their service times are specified by a 2×6
pattern matrix F :
F =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0
]
.
We in order consider two supply profiles, [1 2 0 1 1 1]′
and [1 2 2 1 0 0]′, which are both adequate for the
aforementioned demand ([4 2]′, F ).
a)
 1 2 0 1 1 1
4 0 1 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
b)
 1 2 2 1 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 0 0
2 0 1 1 ∗ ∗ ∗
It is clear that the feasible power allocations for the two
cases are unique, as shown above. The first columns of
the two feasible allocation matrices are respectively [0 1]′
and [1 0]′, and thus differ from each other. That is to
say, if we have no information on [h2 h3 h4 h5 h6]
′, then
it is impossible to find a causal policy which properly
assigns the one unit available in the first time slot to
constitute a feasible power allocation for every possible
case that [1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6]
′ is adequate for the demand.
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Another illustration for the above proposition can be
given in terms of set inclusion as we have done when
discussing the feasibility of LDF algorithms. Revisit the
examples in the above proof and there are only three
possible allocation vectors for the first time slot, which
are [0 0]′, [1 0]′, and [0 1]′. Correspondingly, we obtain
the following three A(:, 1)-dependent sets:{
h¯ ∈ N5 | W (h¯, [4 2]′, F (:, 2 : 6))} ,{
h¯ ∈ N5 | W (h¯, [3 2]′, F (:, 2 : 6))} , and{
h¯ ∈ N5 | W (h¯, [4 1]′, F (:, 2 : 6))} .
However, none of the three sets is the superset of the
other two. Hence, we cannot say which allocation vector
for the first time slot is better in the absence of future
supply information.
In view of Proposition 11, we see that in a real-time
application of MAMD differentiated energy services, the
power delivery scheduler has to make tradeoffs between
the causality and the optimality in terms of feasibility.
In order to better achieve a feasible allocation matrix,
more effort should be made toward more accurate
supply estimation. The proof of the above proposition
also signifies that there exists no causal allocation
policy that is optimal in terms of feasibility for the
duration-deadline jointly differentiated energy services.
In contrast to the corresponding result regarding the
duration-differentiated energy services, Proposition 11
suggests the operation inconvenience resulted by allow-
ing different deadlines and/or arrival times. We reserve it
as an inspiring future research direction on how to make
a better balance between more kinds of service time and
easier operation.
6 Two-Level Hierarchical Scenario
In this section, we introduce a two-level scenario for
the real-time implementation of MAMD differentiated
energy services. As in a forward market implementation,
the supply is assumed to be generated from renewable
resources and thus it is unlikely to obtain accurate
estimation of the available energy units in the distance
future. In this situation, we suppose that the service
provider firstly makes day-ahead contracts with cus-
tomers based on a statistically optimal estimation of the
supply profile. Then, in the real-time implementation, at
the beginning of each time slot, the provider will trade
with the outer electricity market appropriately to make
up for the inaccurate estimation. This is the first level of
the real-time implementation, while at the second level,
the service provider calculates an optimal allocation for
the energy available in the next time slot in light of the
updated supply profile from the upper level and a certain
optimality criterion.
This two-level scenario, depicted in Figure 4, is con-
ducted in a model-predictive manner, where we just
Day-ahead contracts
t = 1
Level 1: ameliorate supply profile
Level 2: allocate supply of time slot t
t = t+ 1
Figure 4. A two-level hierarchical real-time implementation.
update the supply and allocation of the current time
slot with future time slots considered. Out of practical
concerns, we assign each level a proper optimization
problem to reach the required goals under acceptable
computational cost. To be specific, the first level is
associated with the optimal arbitrage problem we are
about to describe, while the second level is related to the
minimum-cost allocation problem introduced later.
6.1 Level 1: Optimal Arbitrage Problem
In the case that the real-time supply from renewable
resources is not adequate, supplementary purchase of
supply has to be made to compensate for the insuffi-
ciency of renewable electricity generation. Conversely,
the redundant supply can also be sold to other grids.
Moreover, there may be potential arbitrage opportuni-
ties so as to earn profits without sacrificing the adequacy
of the supply profile for contracted differentiated energy
services. In summary, the service provider may tactfully
buy or sell units from the outer market to ameliorate
the real-time supply profile, and even obtain arbitrage
interests. This leads us to the optimal arbitrage problem.
Define an auxiliary integer vector p ∈ NT , called the
purchase profile:
p = [p1 p2 · · · pT ]′.
Assume that the unit buying/selling price varies over
time slot and is denoted by bt/st, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Thus, we can define a sequence of time-indexed functions
of expense: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
ft(pt) =
{
btpt, if pt ≥ 0;
stpt, if pt < 0.
Rationally, the unit price for buying is a bit higher than
that for selling, i.e., bt > −st. Otherwise, the service
provider will sell out the existing energy units and then
buy units back from the outer market to maintain the
supply/demand balance.
Specifically, the optimal arbitrage problem aims at
designing a proper purchase profile such that the re-
sulting combined supply profile (h + p) is adequate
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for the demand (r, F ) and the total expenditure is
as small as possible. For simplicity, we assume that
the transaction fee is free. Mathematically, the optimal
arbitrage problem is formulated as
min
A, p
T∑
t=1
ft(pt) (Optimal arbitrage)
subject to (1); (2); (4);
‖A(:, t)‖1 ≤ ht + pt, for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
In spite of the above integer-programming formulation,
we show in Appendix B that the optimal arbitrage
problem can be solved in polynomial time. Moreover, in
a very special case when the buying prices are strictly
positive and time-invariant, while the selling prices
remain zero, the optimal arbitrage problem actually
reduces to investigating the minimum amount of addi-
tional purchase to make an insufficient supply adequate
for the demand (adequacy gap). Such an adequacy
gap problem has been deeply studied in our previous
papers [10,20], where we provide much simpler problem-
specific algorithms other than the off-the-shelf solvers
suggested in Appendix B. For reference, we reproduce
the adequacy gap problem below.
min
p
‖p‖1, (Adequacy gap)
subject to p ∈ NT , W (h+ p, r, F ) ≥ 0.
To summarize, the optimal arbitrage problem can help
ameliorate the real-time supply profile in a twofold sense:
Firstly, the resulting supply profile should be adequate
for the remaining demand, which can aid us in tackling
the volatility of renewable generation from a trading
viewpoint. Secondly, gain benefits from price difference
over time slot. Such benefits may help attract more
electricity consumers and we reserve it as future work
on how to make use of them to construct a better
market with differentiated energy services. Despite the
simplicity, the solutions to optimal arbitrage problems
with meaningful price parameters should shed light on
more complicated matters in actual operations.
6.2 Level 2: Minimum-Cost Allocation Problem
At the second level of this scenario, optimal allocation
problems are taken into account. We herein introduce
one which can be associated with well-studied classic
resource allocation problems. Use A ∈ {0, 1}N×T to
denote a feasible power allocation when the supply is ad-
equate. We can relate a distribution cost weight C(n, t)
to each position in A(n, t) (a potential power delivery)
for the following reasons. Firstly, the available energy
is delivered to different loads via different distribution
lines. Secondly, the running status of power systems
varies over time, which will affect the cost of transporting
one unit from the supply to a certain demand. These

1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1

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h 1
h2
h3
h4
h
5
h
6
r
1
r2
r3
r4
r 5
Figure 5. A pattern matrix and an associated flow network.
weights, constituting a weight matrixC ∈ RN×T , are de-
termined by infrastructure facilities, local power network
status, and relevant power markets, etc. These lead us
to the minimum-cost allocation problem, whose target
is to find a feasible power allocation such that the total
distribution cost (viz. the summation of C(n, t)A(n, t)
over both the load and time indices) is minimum when
the supply is adequate. Following is the mathematical
expression of the optimization problem:
min
A
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
C(n, t)A(n, t) = tr(CA)
(Minimum-cost allocation)
subject to (1); (2); (3); (4).
At first sight, the above problem is an integer linear pro-
gram and would be intractable. However, we can show
its polynomial solvability by casting the minimum-cost
allocation problem into a minimum-cost flow problem.
To this end, we give the corresponding network-flow
formulation of the minimum-cost allocation problem. An
illustrative example is presented in Figure 5. Initially,
a single source node and a single sink node are given
in the flow network. We associate time slot t with a
particular node and construct an arc from the source
node to the node with capacity ht, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Similarly, we associate load n with a particular node and
construct an arc from the node to the sink node with
capacity rn, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . In addition, for each
one in the pattern matrix F , we construct an arc from
the corresponding time-slot node to the corresponding
load node with capacity one. To this point, we complete
the construction of the associated flow network. Clearly,
every feasible power allocation matrix corresponds to
a feasible flow in the constructed flow network. The
flow on any arc connected to the source or sink node
has zero cost, while the flow on the arc connecting the
tth time-slot node to the nth load node has the per-
unit cost C(n, t). The minimum-cost flow problem is
to find a feasible flow of value ‖r‖1 with the minimum
cost. Ordinarily, the minimum-cost flow problem deals
with real numbers. Nevertheless, we see the equivalence
between the minimum-cost allocation problem and the
minimum-cost flow problem in the constructed flow
network with the help of the following lemma [29].
Lemma 12 (Primal Integrality) If each edge has an
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integer capacity, then there exists an integer flow which
is an optimal solution to the minimum-cost flow problem.
The minimum-cost flow problem is known as a classic
decision problem and several network-flow algorithms
can be applied to finding an optimal integer flow when
each edge has an integer capacity. A thorough survey
of these algorithms can be found in [29]. Thus, we
have verified that the minimum-cost allocation problem
can be solved in polynomial time with the help of the
network-flow reformulation and existing network-flow
algorithms, like the network simplex algorithm [30]. By
further exploring the statistical characteristics of the
input data, one can select a statistically better network-
flow solver to achieve the optimal solution.
As suggested by the optimal arbitrage and minimum-
cost problems, optimization problems regarding MAMD
differentiated energy servcies are integer programs in
their original forms and may be deemed intractable at
first sight. However, because of their nice properties
regarding objective functions and feasible regions, they
can be properly transformed into problem formulations
with standard solvers. A common case is that we can
eliminate the gap between the original integer program
and the relaxed non-integer program, e.g., the optimal
arbitrage problem. A better case is that the original form
can be transformed into a network formulation, which
is generally equipped with more efficient specialized
algorithms, e.g., the minimum-cost allocation problem.
Although not every optimization problem regarding
MAMD differentiated energy services can be efficiently
solvable, the two problems discussed in this section
can cover a number of real applications and thus ap-
plicable in practical implementations. In particular, by
embedding the two problems in the two-level hierarchical
implementation introduced in the beginning, we can
reach the goals for each level to a certain degree.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we investigate the market implementation
of MAMD differentiated energy services. Firstly, by
examining a forward market implementation, we demon-
strate the economic feasibility of MAMD differentiated
energy services by proving the existence of an efficient
competitive equilibrium. We show that the distributive
solution in the competitive price system is consistent
with the centralized one attained by a social planner.
Informally speaking, the market mechanism itself can
allocate resources efficiently. Secondly, as a step toward
real-time applications of MAMD differentiated energy
services, we study allocation policies without future
supply information. Since there exists no allocation
policy which is both causal and optimal in terms of
feasibility, we take notice of the influence of future infor-
mation on current decisions. Finally, we introduce a two-
level hierarchical real-time implementation of MAMD
differentiated energy services. Specifically, we propose
the optimal arbitrage problem to ameliorate the supply
profile at the first level, and the minimum-cost allocation
problem to minimize the distribution cost at the second
level. We show that both problems are raised out of
practical concerns and can be solved in polynomial time,
irrespective of their integer-programming formulations.
In the future, we will put more emphasis on the practical
applications of differentiated energy services. Firstly,
we will conduct a real-time application of differenti-
ated energy services driven by field data. Secondly,
considering economic analysis, we should not ignore
the market design, which requires more attention on
the market dynamics. Moreover, as mentioned before,
the estimation of supply may not be accurate. Many
technical issues remain to be discussed regarding how to
apply differentiated energy services more efficiently in
the presence of such uncertainties [31].
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A Totally Unimodular Matrices
Totally unimodular matrices play an important role in
the study of tractable integer programs. Below are a few
useful concepts from books [32] and [33].
Definition 13 A matrix is called a totally unimodular
matrix (TUM) if every square submatrix has determi-
nant −1, 0, and 1.
A collection of equivalent characterizations for TUMs
can be found in Theorem 19.3 of [33]. Given a matrix,
we can check whether it is a TUM in polynomial time.
Also, it is well known that many special matrices belong
to TUMs, e.g., the incidence matrix of a directed graph,
the incidence matrix of an undirected bipartite graph,
and the coefficient matrix derived by the constraints
of a maximum flow problem. The magic of TUMs lies
in that they eliminate the integrality gap between an
integer linear program and its relaxed linear program.
To see this, look at the following lemma. Note that
a polyhedron {x | Ax ≤ b} is said to be an integer
polyhedron if it is the convex hull of all the integer
vectors inside it.
Lemma 14 ([33]) If A is a TUM and b is an integer
vector, then the polyhedron {x | Ax ≤ b} is an integer
polyhedron.
B Tractability of Optimal Arbitrage Problem
In general, integer programming is NP-complete. How-
ever, it happens that a class of integer programs are
tractable if both the objective function and the feasible
region possess nice properties. Based on this, we analyze
13
the tractability of the optimal arbitrage problem from
the two aspects.
Firstly, we see that ft(pt) is a convex function for pt ∈ R.
Actually, the objective function of the optimal arbitrage
problem is a separable convex function, which is defined
as the summation of independent single-variable convex
functions. As shown in [34], a single-variable integer
convex function can be closely approximated by a linear
minimization program over an auxiliary optimization
variable vector. In a similar manner, we can transform
the separable convex objective function into a linear
program over separate auxiliary optimization variable
vectors. Without loss of generality, we stack all the
auxiliary variable vectors into a bigger vector and call
it γ. Therefore, the function value of
∑T
t=1 ft(pt) is given
by the optimum of an associated linear program over
the newly introduced variable vector γ. As a result,
by replacing the original separable convex objective
functions with a linear program over γ in accordance
with the procedures in [34], we can attain an equivalent
ILP over the three optimization variables: γ,A,p, for
the considered optimal arbitrage problem.
Secondly, we will show that the feasible region of the
optimal arbitrage problem also has a nice property.
Recast the constraints of the optimal arbitrage problem
in the matrix-vector form:
A˜
[
vec(A)
p
]
≤ b˜,
where vec(A) denotes the vector-form of A. It is easily
seen that the coefficient matrix A˜ is derived from a
coefficient matrix of a particular maximum flow prob-
lem, by appending an appropriate number of rows or
columns with only one nonzero element, which is ±1.
As mentioned in Appendix A, the coefficient matrix of
a maximum flow problem is totally unimodular while
the unimodularity of a matrix will be preserved after
appending a row whose single nonzero element is 1 or−1.
Therefore, we can conclude that A˜ is a TUM as well.
Moreover, we see that b˜ is an integer vector. Thus, by
Lemma 14 in Appendix A, the following set is an integer
polyhedron:{[
vec(A)
p
]
A˜
[
vec(A)
p
]
≤ b˜
}
.
In other words, the extreme points of this polyhedron
all consist of integer elements.
In view of these, we relax the equivalent ILP mentioned
before into a LP. Due to the special property of the
feasible region of the optimal arbitrage problem, we see
that if (γˆ, Aˆ, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the relaxed LP,
which is also an extreme point of the feasible region of
the LP, then (γˆ, Aˆ, pˆ) is also an optimal solution to the
resulting ILP. Furthermore, by trivial projection, we see
that (Aˆ, pˆ) is also an optimal solution to the optimal
arbitrage problem.
To summarize, the optimal arbitrage problem can be
abstractly solved as follows. Firstly, we recast the opti-
mal arbitrage problem into its equivalent ILP. Secondly,
solve the corresponding relaxed LP by finding an optimal
extreme point. Finally, extract an optimal solution to
the optimal arbitrage problem from the aforementioned
extreme point. Since the transformations in the first
and third steps can be done in polynomial time and we
just solve a LP in the second step, we can conclude the
tractability of the optimal arbitrage problem.
14
